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Abstract
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Although both China and India are labor-abundant 
and dependant on manufactures, their export mixes are 
very different. Only one product—refined petroleum—
appears in the top 25 products for both countries, and 
services exports are roughly twice as important for India 
as for China, which is much better integrated into global 
production networks. Even assuming India also begins 
to integrate into global production chains and expands 
exports of manufactures, there seems to be opportunity 
for rapid growth in both countries. Accelerated growth 
through efficiency improvements in China and India, 
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Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at b.dimaranan@cgiar.org, eianchovichina@worldbank.
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especially in their high-tech industries, will intensify 
competition in global markets leading to contraction 
of the manufacturing sectors in many countries. 
Improvement in the range and quality of exports from 
China and India has the potential to create substantial 
welfare benefits for the world, and for China and India, 
and to act as a powerful offset to the terms-of-trade losses 
otherwise associated with rapid export growth. However, 
without efforts to keep up with China and India, some 
countries may see further erosion of their export shares 
and high-tech manufacturing sectors. 
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China, India, and the Future of the World Economy:  
Fierce Competition or Shared Growth? 
 
The rapid economic growth of China and India has been associated with much more rapid growth in 
their trade. In some cases, this has created enormous opportunities for their trading partners. In others, it 
has created strong competition either in home markets, or in third markets. Those who face increases in 
competition are frequently more vocal, but a balanced assessment is needed to help develop appropriate 
policy responses. If some countries lose from increased competition, as found by Freund and Ozden 
(2006) and Hanson and Robertson (2006), which countries and which industries will face the most 
serious competition? And where will the largest opportunities be found? 
 
A key determinant of the distributional implications of global competition is the extent to which 
countries’ baskets of goods overlap. Traditional trade models where comparative advantage follows 
from countries’ relative endowments imply that extremely labor-abundant countries like China and India 
will manufacture and export labor-intensive goods, while skill- and capital-abundant developed 
countries will specialize in skill- and capital-intensive products. According to these models, developed 
economies have little reason to be concerned by the emergence of China and India as global economic 
powers. However, other labor-abundant developing economies have much to lose as traditional theory 
highlights expansion of existing products (the intensive margin) as the only source of export growth.  
 
Many of these expectations about the potential impact of the expansion of exports from China and India 
may be biased or exaggerated. The expansion of China and India’s trade is quite different from the 
expansion of developing country exports considered in much of the development literature. It involves, 
for instance, two-way trade in manufactures and services, which make the recipient countries the 
beneficiaries of improvements in efficiency in their trading partners (Martin 1993). It also involves 
fragmentation and global production sharing, where part of the production process is undertaken in one 
economy, and subsequent stages are undertaken in another (Ando and Kimura 2003; Gaulier, Lemoine 
and Unal-Kesenci 2004). This makes participants in this process beneficiaries from, rather than victims 
of, improvements in the competitiveness of their partners. And new trade theory now recognizes that 
export expansion does not involve just increases in exports of the same products. Rapidly growing  
economies expand the range of products they export, improve product quality, and export to additional 
markets as their exports grow (Evenett and Venables 2002; Hummels and Klenow 2005). 
 
Complicating the analysis is the fact that, while both China and India are more labor-abundant than 
developed economies, relative factor endowments and income levels vary substantially across regions 
within these economies. China’s coastal areas may place it in a different category compared to the much 
more labor-abundant inland provinces. This heterogeneity can influence the range of goods China 
produces and exports, and therefore helps explain the disproportionate similarity of China’s export 
bundle with that of the developed countries (Schott, 2007). India’s large number of skilled workers also 
implies that there may be a lot more competition between India and developed economies than 
suggested by its relative endowment shares.  
 
Much can be learned by examining China’s and India’s trading patterns. Although it turns out that both 
have been quite successful in expanding their exports and imports, they have done this in very different 
ways. Broadly, China has relied primarily on exports of manufactures, frequently as part of an East 
Asian production sharing network. By contrast, India has concentrated more heavily on services. Within 
manufactures, China has relied heavily on exports of finished goods, while India has focused much more 
on exports of intermediate inputs. India’s exports are frequently of capital- and skill-intensive goods, 
while China has emphasized exports of labor-intensive goods — although these are increasingly 
sophisticated (Rodrik 2006). Indeed recent research suggests that China’s export bundle overlaps with 
that of developed countries much more substantially than one would expect given either its level of 
development or its size, and this excess similarity has increased with time (Schott 2007). China’s rank in 
terms of the similarity of its export bundle with the OECD jumped from nineteen in 1972 to four in 2001. 
No other country’s growth in product penetration comes close to the increase observed for China. 
Quality differences between Chinese and developed country exports however suggest that competition 
between China and developed countries may not be as direct as suggested by the overlap of their export 
baskets.  
 
Although China and India do not appear to be in direct competition, reforms under way in India may 
intensify competition between them as well as intensify competition between these two giants and the 
rest of the world. Accelerated growth in China and India may create opportunities for some and threaten 
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others and the outcomes may differ depending on whether this growth is accompanied by quality 
improvements and variety expansion, and whether it is driven by physical or capital accumulation. Who 
will win and who will lose from these developments? We undertake the analysis in this paper with these 
questions in mind. 
 
No analysis of potential future developments can reliably be undertaken without an examination of the 
key features of the current situation, and how it arose. Therefore, this paper first reviews some key 
features of China’s and India’s trade, in particular, the recent rapid export growth; the changing relative 
importance of goods and services; and the changing composition of exports within merchandise and 
services. With this as background, we use a global economy-wide modeling approach to take into 
account all of the potential impacts of a number of policy reforms and likely scenarios. First, the 
implications of the reforms under way in India are examined to see if they might result in greater 
competition between China and India. Then, we generate a baseline and examine the potential global 
implications of higher-than-expected growth rates in these two economies. We consider first the impact 
of more rapid economy-wide growth in China and India. We then examine the implications of two 
different types of growth, first growth focused on relatively sophisticated products, and subsequently 
growth driven by increased accumulation of physical and human capital.  
 
Unlike other approaches used to analyze these issues,
1 the global applied general equilibrium model 
used in this paper ensures consistency while including important industry detail – each region’s exports 
of particular goods equal total imports of these goods into other regions (less shipping costs); global 
investment equals the sum of regional savings; regional output determines regional income; global 
supply and demand for individual goods balance; and in each country/region demand for a factor equals 
its supply. These accounting relationships and the behavioral linkages in the model constrain the 
outcomes in important ways not found in partial equilibrium analyses—increased exports from one 
country must be accommodated by increased imports by other countries; broad-based increases in 
                                                 
1 At the time this analysis took place there were no papers that used a global applied general equilibrium model to study the 
implications of China’s and India’s growth on global trade. More recently, McDonald, Robinson and Thierfelder (2007) 
employed a global AGE model to analyze the impact of the dramatic expansion of trade by India, China and the developing 
East and Southeast Asia. Their findings are consistent with ours although they do not investigate the impact of India’s 
increased integration into the global economy, alternative growth scenarios, and the impact of growth at the extensive and 
quality margins. Instead they focus on a 10 percent improvement in total factor productivity in the value added function of 
non-agricultural sectors in China, India and developing Asia and the effect of regional trade agreements in East Asia on the 
rest of the world.   
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productivity that raise competitiveness also raise factor prices and help offset the original increase in 
competitiveness.  
Developments in Trade 
 
China and India have grown relatively rapidly in recent years, and, in both, the importance of trade has 
risen substantially relative to GDP. Although both of these large, low-income countries had very low 
export-to-GDP ratios around 1980, when the process of reform was beginning in China (Srinivasan 
2004), since then both have increased their exports sharply, although  India’s export growth has been 
much more modest than China’s (Figure 1).
2  From the mid-1990s, as the export processing 
arrangements were broadened beyond the initial special economic zones in China,
3 the share of exports 
in China’s GDP began to climb sharply. With the sharp devaluation of the official exchange rate in 1994, 
the share of exports in GDP rose, but then stabilized or declined in the mid-1990s. From 2001 to 2004, 
China’s export share rose dramatically, to around 40%, over two and a half times India’s export share. 
Even the upward revision to GDP of 17 percent in 2004 (see World Bank Office, Beijing 2006) leaves 
China’s export share at 31%, more than double India’s level. 
China’s export growth has been accompanied by tremendous growth in product variety. While China 
was present in 9 percent of all manufacturing product categories in 1972, it was present in 70 percent of 
categories by 2001 (Schott 2007). The quality gap between China and the developed countries has been 
increasing with time in some industries suggesting that developed economies might be responding to 
competition from China and other low-wage countries by raising the sophistication of their exports or 
dropping the least-sophisticated varieties from their export bundle. 
 
China’s export growth has been accompanied by tremendous growth in product variety. While China 
was present in 9 percent of all manufacturing product categories in 1972, it was present in 70 percent of 
categories by 2001 (Schott 2007). The quality gap between China and the developed countries has been 
                                                 
2 China’s trade volume is much larger than India’s, but the cost of switching trade flows away from China are much lower 
than those of India. This is the case because China supplies mostly modular production – i.e. components that can be added 
on or off with ease (Steinfeld 2002), while India supplies customized and some “mission critical” services to multination 
corporation – i.e. operations with extremely high switching costs. 
3 The export processing arrangements included duty exemptions on imports used for the production of exports. These 
exemptions were offered to foreign invested enterprises that initially were located in special economic zones in the southern 
coastal regions of China, but were subsequently broadened to a wide range of enterprises (World Bank 1994) which typically 
did not receive the economically questionable and (now WTO-inconsistent) income-tax concessions traditionally available in 
the zones.  
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increasing with time in some industries suggesting that developed economies might be responding to 
competition from China and other low-wage countries by raising the sophistication of their exports or 
dropping the least-sophisticated varieties from their export bundle. 
 







































Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 
 
 
Exports of Services 
A striking difference between China and India is in the importance of services relative to merchandise 
exports. India’s share of commercial services in total goods and services exports has been much higher 
than China’s, not just since the rapid expansion of exports of computing services around 2000, but for 
the entire period since 1992 during which comparable estimates are available (Figure 2). The share of 
services in India’s exports began, at around 20 percent, over twice as high as China’s. This share 
declined in India until the late 1990s, when it again began to rise sharply. Since 2000, services have 
accounted for over a quarter of India’s exports, while the share of services in China’s exports has 
declined to under 10 percent of total exports—although China’s exports of services have been growing 
rapidly in absolute terms.  
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 
 
There have also been sharp changes in the composition of services exports as noted in Dimaranan, 
Ianchovichina and Martin (2006). In India, the main development was a dramatic increase in the 
importance of communications and computing services, from approximately 40 percent of all services 
exports in 1990 to roughly two-thirds in recent years. In China, travel and tourism services rose from a 
little more than 20 percent of all services exports in 1990 to approximately 50 percent in 2002. In 2003, 
the share of travel and tourism declined, while the share of communication and computing services 
expanded from about 25 percent to more than 50 percent.  
  
Merchandise Trade 
Although both China’s and India’s merchandise exports are dominated by manufactures (World Bank 
2003) the composition of these manufactures and the approach to their production differs considerably. 
For the purpose of discerning these differences we look at information on export and import patterns for 
each country using data by stage of production from the United Nations’ Broad Economic Classification 
(BEC) system (Table 1). Because of the very different importance of fuel imports and exports to the two 
countries, we discuss only non-fuel products.  
 
If we look first at the import data for 2004, we find that 63 percent of China’s non-fuel imports are of 
manufactured intermediate inputs, while these account for 60 percent of India’s imports. Only when we 
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consider imports of parts and components do we see the sharp distinction between the two countries that 
might be expected given the discussions on global production sharing. These accounted for 31 percent of 
China’s merchandise imports, as against only 12 percent in India.  
 
On the export side, the two countries differ substantially in the importance of final goods in their exports. 
While 61 percent of China’s non-fuel exports are classified as final goods, only 40 percent of India’s 
exports are final goods, with 52 percent intermediate manufactured goods, and 8 percent non-fuel 
primary products.  
 
Between 1992 and 2004, the major change evident is the dramatic increase of China’s trade in parts and 
components. In 1992, these accounted for only 15 percent of non-fuel imports, but this share rose to 31 
percent by 2004.  By contrast, in India, this share declined from 15 to 12 percent. While discussions of 
China’s role in production networks tend to focus on China’s role as an importer of components, it is 
notable that there has also been a substantial increase in the importance of parts and components in 
China’s exports, with this share rising from 5 to 15 percent. By contrast, in India, this share rose from 5 
to just 6 percent of total non-fuel exports. These data are consistent with the widespread perception that 
India remains much less integrated than China in global production networks, despite the existence of 
Indian policies to allow duty-free access to imported components for use in the production of exports 
(World Bank 2004). 
Table 1. Composition of Non-fuel Imports and Exports by Broad Economic Classification  
 China    India   
 Imports  Exports  Imports Exports 
2004        
Nonfuel Primary Inputs  10  1  16  8 
Intermediate inputs  63  38  60  52 
Final Goods  28  61  25  40 
Total 100  100  100  100 
Parts/components 31  17  12  6 
1992        
Nonfuel Primary Inputs  8  6  30  6 
Intermediate inputs  61  30  55  47 
Final Goods  31  65  15  47 
Total 100  100  100  100 
Parts/components 15  5  15  5 
Source: UN COMTRADE statistics from the World Bank WITS system. 
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As Hausman and Rodrik (2003) have emphasized, different countries’ exports reflect a wide range of 
differences in trade regimes, as well as idiosyncratic factors that lead apparently similar countries to 
have very different product mixes at the finer levels of disaggregation. The top 25 exports of China and 
India for 2004, at the six-digit level of the Harmonized system (HS), which account for 58.4 percent of 
India’s merchandise exports, and 38.4 percent of China’s turn out to be almost mutually exclusive sets. 
Only one product—refined petroleum - enters both lists, accounting for over 9 percent of India’s exports 
and 0.9 percent of China’s. A notable feature of China’s list is the prominence of computer and 
electronic equipment products under Chapters 84 and 85. These two chapters (which also include non-
electronic equipment) alone accounted for almost 42 percent of China’s exports in 2004, up from 16 
percent in 1994. In India, three HS products under Chapter 71 (diamonds and jewelry) and refined 
petroleum under Chapter 27 likewise accounted for 28 percent of total exports.  
Methodology and Simulation Design 
The preceding discussion of trade patterns provides valuable background, but does not allow us to assess 
the implications of high growth in China and India and increased competition between China and India 
as India implements reforms that speed up its integration into global production networks. To do this, we 
use a modified version of the standard GTAP model.
4 The model emphasizes the role of intersectoral 
factor mobility in determining sectoral output supply. Product differentiation between imported and 
domestic goods, and among imports from different regions, allows for two-way trade in each product 
category, depending on the ease of substitution between products from different regions. Factor inputs of 
land, capital, skilled and unskilled labor, and in some sectors a natural resource factor, are included in 
the analysis. The model includes the explicit treatment of international trade and transport margins, a 
“global” bank designed to mediate between world savings and investment, and a relatively sophisticated 
consumer demand system designed to capture differential price and income responsiveness across 
countries.  
 
The constant returns to scale version of the GTAP model was adjusted to incorporate China’s duty 
exemptions—which have been a key reason for the rapid integration of China into global production 
                                                 
4 This applied general equilibrium model is documented comprehensively in Hertel (1997) and in the GTAP Data Base 
documentation (Dimaranan 2006). 
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networks-- and to allow analysis of the impact of an effective system of duty exemptions for inputs used 
in the production of exports in India. Duty exemptions were incorporated in the GTAP model and data 
base following the methodology developed by Ianchovichina (2004). This duty exemption model allows 
for two separate activities in each industry. Production of exports is represented as an activity for which 
imported intermediate inputs are available duty-free. Production for the domestic market uses the same 
technology, but requires payment of duties on intermediate inputs. Firms engaging in production for 
either the domestic market or the export market purchase both imported and domestic intermediate 
inputs which are imperfect substitutes following the Armington structure. Ianchovichina (2004) 
documents the approach used to introduce duty exemptions into the GTAP model and shows that failing 
to account for duty exemptions introduces bias in trade liberalization outcomes in countries with such a 
system. 
 
The 57 sectors and 87 regions of the GTAP 6 Data Base were aggregated into 26 sectors (Table 2) and 
24 regions (Table 3) based on the importance of these sectors and regions in China’s and India’s trade 
patterns. To start, we used historical and projected growth rates for GDP, skilled labor, unskilled labor, 
capital, and population to roll the global economy forward to 2005. This pre-simulation essentially 
updates the database for 2001 to 2005, the starting point of our projection simulations. It also includes 
the removal of textile and apparel quotas on exports to Canada, USA, and EU under the Agreement of 
Textiles and Clothing; China’s WTO accession commitments following Ianchovichina and Martin 
(2004); and the remaining commitments of developing countries under the Uruguay Round using tariff 
data from Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2005). The efficiency gains in China’s motor vehicle sector 
resulting from WTO accession reforms are captured using productivity shocks as in Ianchovichina and 
Martin (2004). 
Will India’s integration into global production networks intensify global competition? 
While the examination of trade data above suggests that there is surprisingly little overlap in the export 
mix of China and India, this might change in light of India’s move to greater integration in the world 
economy. We therefore look at the impact of implementing a well-functioning duty 
exemption/drawback system in India on the rest of the world by including the very large reductions in 
protection that have been undertaken in India since 2001; the further reductions in manufacturing sector 
protection that have been foreshadowed by the government; and measures intended to enable Indian 
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manufacturers to fully participate in global production sharing. These measures include more effective 
duty exemptions for intermediates used in the production of manufactured exports, tariff cuts intended to 
bring  tariffs on manufactured products to around the 7%  level prevailing in China post-Accession 




We find that the impact of implementing a well-functioning duty drawback system in India on the world 
economy is relatively small. This is not surprising given the fact that India’s economy is not yet well 
integrated with the global economy. In 2001 India’s share in total intermediate imports of motor vehicles, 
machinery and equipment, electronics and other manufactures used in the production of exports was 1.7 
percent, compared to 10.2 percent for China. India’s share in total intermediate imports used in the 
production of exports
6 was 1.2 percent in 2001. 
 
The effect of implementing duty exemptions successfully and lowering tariffs and transport costs is 
small at the aggregate level, but significant for some industries in India (Table 2). India’s total welfare 
gain from these reforms is assessed at $5 billion per year (in 2001 dollars), or close to 1 percent of per 
capita real income. The largest part of this gain in welfare is from transport cost savings ($2.2 billion, 
nearly half of the welfare gain), followed by $1.6 billion from tariff cuts on manufactured goods, and 
$1.1 billion from successful implementation of duty drawbacks. Output expansion is strong for the 
sectors benefiting most strongly from duty exemptions. The electronics sector expands by 35 percent, 
machinery and equipment by 21 percent, apparel by 13 percent, leather goods by 12 percent, other 
manufactures by 9 percent, and motor vehicles and parts by 1 percent (Table 2). The sectors producing 
textiles, metals, chemicals, minerals, wood and paper products contract and their producer prices decline 
as a result of increased competition from imports (Table 2).  
 
The results suggest that India will likely strengthen its ties with global production chains and expand its 
trade in manufactured products if duty exemption/drawback arrangements are made more effective, 
trade is liberalized and logistical efficiency increased. Exports of Indian manufactured products will 
                                                 
5 The tariff reduction is based on continuation of the rapid liberalization undertaken in India’s non-agricultural tariffs in 
recent years. The reduction in transport costs is based on broad estimates by trade-facilitation experts of the potential cost-
reducing impacts of trade facilitation measures.  
6 Source www.gtap.org 
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expand by 67 percent, with some sectors’ volumes of exports more than doubling. For example, the 
volume of machinery and equipment exports goes up by 168 percent (Table 2), while that of electronics 
rises by 140 percent. The total volume of imports goes up by 50 percent due to a jump in imports of 
manufactured goods. Imports of metals, textiles, apparel and other light manufactures more than triple 
(Table 2). As a result of the expansion of the manufacturing sector, real returns to the factors used most 
intensively in these sectors – physical and human capital, and unskilled labor – go up by more than 3 
percent (Table 2). It should be noted that the results reported here may be overstated because the model 
does not take into account the policies in India that restrict the movement of labor across industries. 
 
Will the rapid integration of India into global production networks imply increased competition between 
India and China? Since the most rapid expansion of India’s exports occurs in manufactures, one might 
have expected that this would increase the degree of competition between India and China. But this does 
not actually happen.  In Figure 3, a comparison of the share of each product represented in the model in 
China’s exports (represented by bars) with the corresponding share in India’s exports before (B-India) 
and after the policy reforms (P-India) suggests that these reforms will not expand India’s exports of 
products in which China has particularly large export shares. In fact, the correlation for overall exports 
rises modestly, from 0.37 to 0.41. However, the correlation within manufactures falls from 0.01 to -0.02 
as India expands the exports of products in which China’s share is relatively small and vice versa. In 
only one sector – machinery and equipment – is India expected to increase its exports and intensify 
competition between the two giant economies. These findings suggest that India’s reform efforts to 
integrate better with the world economy are therefore unlikely to intensify head-on competition between 
China and India. It is important to note however that the situation might change if labor restrictions in 
India and financial repression in China are lifted. Then competition in the labor-intensive product 
markets between the two countries is expected to intensify sharply.  
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Table 2. The Impact of India’s Integration with the World Economy (% changes) 
Product Output  Producer  Prices Exports  Imports 
Rice  1.12 0.50  24.83  15.04 
Wheat  0.44 0.23  12.71  2.75 
Grains  0.14 0.65 0.98 3.48 
Vegetables and Fruits  -0.42 0.49 12.15 6.35 
Oils and Fats  -1.75 0.10 11.18 8.23 
Sugar  0.31 0.73  11.34  13.73 
Plant Fibers  -1.89 -0.07 12.05 1.94 
Other Crops  -0.10 0.59 8.46 11.46 
Livestock and Meat  -0.03 0.76 5.23 9.66 
Dairy  0.34 1.01 -6.57  13.80 
Other Processed Foods  0.70 0.55 4.37 5.85 
Energy  -0.83 -0.87 42.47 -0.20 
Textiles  -1.90 -0.83 35.70  234.58 
Wearing Apparel  12.78 -0.81 26.55  257.38 
Leather  11.57 -1.34 48.70  241.71 
Wood and Paper  -8.85 -0.27 30.17 90.69 
Minerals  -3.28 -0.62 38.35 46.31 
Chemicals, Rubber, & Plastics  -8.82 -3.42 90.22  128.04 
Metals  -11.76 -3.25 108.29  209.06 
Motor Vehicles and Parts  1.41 -2.31  59.51  30.91 
Machinery and Equipment  20.98 -4.42  167.71  41.11 
Electronics  34.97 -3.64  140.28 3.18 
Other Manufactures  9.41 -3.19  56.48  82.57 
Trade and Transport  -0.21 0.43 -1.81 1.51 
Commercial Services  0.29 0.30 -0.62 1.46 
Other Services  0.36 0.32 -1.09 1.75 
Food  0.02 0.55 9.85 7.23 
Energy and minerals  -1.50  -0.80  39.47  6.27 
Manufactures -0.49  -2.74  67.63  84.17 
Services 0.14  0.36  -0.68  1.51 
Total  1.14 -1.08  52.36 50.46 
Welfare represented as:   EV in US$ 2001  4989  Per capita utility  0.91 
Real returns to:  Capital  3.26  Skilled labor  3.88 
 Land  1.70  Unskilled  labor  3.28 
Source: Authors’ simulations with modified GTAP model; see details in text. The simulation includes introduction of duty drawbacks, a drop in 
manufacturing tariffs to 7%, and a reduction in transport costs to and from India by 20%.. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Who gains and who loses from growth in China and India? 
We next explore the implications of strong growth prospects in China and India in the context of world 
economic expansion over 2005-2020 (Table 3).
7 This process provides a baseline from which we can 
assess the impact of an additional 2.1 percentage point annual growth in China, and 1.9 percentage point 
annual growth in India, in the period 2005-2020. Using the methodology for assessing potential growth 
impacts of reform presented in Ianchovichina and Kacker (2005), we concluded that these were 
potentially feasible increases relative to the baseline.
8,9 We implement these growth dividends using 
favorable, sector-neutral, annual shocks to total factor productivity (TFP) of the same size. These 
assessments of upside potential are perhaps conservative in that they do not explicitly take into account 
the potential benefits from reforms of labor market policies in India that are widely believed to have 
enormous potential for productivity growth and fuller participation in global production chains (Mitra 
and Ural 2006). Nor do they fully account for the potential benefits of reforms in services trade 
(Nikomborirak 2006), which Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2005) find to be potentially very large.  
                                                 
7 The forecasts of growth rates for real GDP, skilled and unskilled labor inputs, investment and capital accumulation, and 
population were based on the ‘central projections’ for 2005-2015 in the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects database 
at the time the analysis was undertaken. The methodology for constructing the macroeconomic projections to 2020 (known as 
the “GTAP baseline”) is documented in Walmsley, Dimaranan, and McDougall (2002). The growth rates to 2020 are very 
close to the World Bank’s ‘central projections’ to 2020 used in Winters and Yusuf (2006).  
8 Ianchovichina and Kacker (2005) present growth scenarios for all developing countries using a cross-country growth model.  
9 The increases in TFP growth can also be interpreted as gains due to increasing returns to scale. 
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Table 3. Output, Factor Inputs, and Population Projections, 2005-2020 (annual, average growth 
rates, in percent) 







Australia and New Zealand  3.5 1.6 0.6  3.8 0.7 
China  6.6 0.8 3.9  8.5 0.6 
Japan  1.6 0.2 -0.7  2.5 -0.2 
Korea  4.7 2.0 5.8  4.9 0.3 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, China  4.3 0.6 3.0  4.9 0.4 
Indonesia  5.2 2.7 6.5  4.7 1.1 
Malaysia  5.6 -1.4 3.9  5.8 1.4 
Philippines  3.5 1.8 4.6  3.5 1.5 
Singapore  4.9 0.6 1.1  5.3 0.8 
Thailand  4.6 0.1 3.2  3.9 0.5 
Vietnam  5.4 1.4 1.9  6.0 1.1 
Rest of South East Asia  3.1 1.3 3.6  3.6 1.0 
India  5.5 1.6 4.0  6.1 1.1 
Rest of South Asia  5.0 2.1 3.6  5.1 1.7 
Canada  2.6 1.6 0.9  3.2 0.4 
USA  3.2 1.5 0.8  3.9 0.7 
Mexico  3.8 2.7 4.6  3.3 1.4 
Argentina and Brazil  3.6 0.9 3.7  3.1 1.0 
Rest of Latin America  3.3 1.6 3.8  3.6 1.3 
European Union 25 and EFTA  2.3 0.3 0.0  2.6 -0.1 
Former Soviet Union  3.2 0.3 0.8  3.6 -0.1 
Middle East and North Africa  4.1 1.7 3.3  4.1 1.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa  3.5 2.6 3.3  3.2 1.9 
Rest of the World  3.7 0.7 1.2  2.6 0.5 
Low income countries  4.7 1.7 3.1  4.2 1.5 
Middle income countries  4.5 1.0 3.1  3.9 0.8 
High income countries  2.7 0.9 0.4  3.0 0.2 
World  3.1 0.9 0.8  3.2 0.9 
Source: World Bank projections to 2015 extrapolated to 2020 
 
We then assess the impact of strong growth on the quality and variety of exports from China and India. 
Quality improvements in exports have recently been identified as a key influence on the performance of 
rapidly growing exporters such as China and India (Hummels and Klenow 2005). We follow Hummels 
and Klenow who observe that larger economies export more in absolute terms than smaller economies 
and analyze the extent to which larger economies export higher volumes of each good (intensive margin 
growth), a wider set of goods (the extensive margin), and improved-quality goods. Their estimates imply 
that rising quality in existing product lines accounts for increases of approximately 0.09 percent in 
export prices for each one percent increase in income levels, despite increases of 0.34 percent in the 
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quantities exported. Further, they find that 66 percent of the export growth resulting from an increase in 
income arises from export of new products and exports of existing products to new markets.
10  
 
In the standard modeling framework in which we work, the number of explicit goods cannot, in fact rise 
as exports grow. However, both the increase in the number of varieties exported, and the improvements 
in the quality of goods exported result in increases in the demand for goods contained within each of our 
standard aggregates. We specify these increases in demand as product-augmenting technical changes 
that increase the effective quantity of each good in the eyes of the purchaser, and correspondingly lower 
the effective price of the good to the purchaser. Using the price aggregator dual to Hummels and 
Klenow’s quantity aggregator, we are able to specify the reduction in the effective price associated with 
their combinations of increases in variety and quality. This price aggregator is: 




















N P , 
where P is the actual price of individual commodity exports, N is the number of varieties, λ is the quality 
index and P* is the overall effective price of exports. With this, we can calculate the change in the 
effective price corresponding to a change in real GDP. With an elasticity of substitution σ equal to 7.5,
11 
we show that the effective price declines corresponding to the cumulative increases in China’s and 
India’s real GDP growth in the high growth scenario relative to the baseline are 9.2 percent and 8.2 
percent, respectively. We implement this as a 9.2 percent and an 8.2 percent product-quality-augmenting 
technical change on imports by other countries from China and India, respectively.  
 
Our simulations of growth and quality improvement include most of the broad features of new economic 
geography models such as Puga and Venables (1999). Improved variety and quality of exports from 
China and India raise welfare, and lower production costs in their trading partners, in the same way that 
increased variety does in the Puga-Venables model—that is through a reduction in the effective price of 
imports from the expanding country. In our formulation, trading partners also face increased competition 
in third markets, reducing welfare in their competitors. Induced increases in import demand from China 
and India improve the terms of trade of their trading partners in our formulation, as in Puga and 
                                                 
10 Hummels and Klenow (2005) find that the contribution of the extensive margin varies with the levels of aggregation. At 
the 6-digit level exports of new varieties account for 66 percent of the country differences in exports. At the 1-digit level the 
variety effect accounts for 15 percent of the country differences in exports. 
11 This is the mid-range value considered in Hummels and Klenow (2005).   
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Venables. One difference is that increases in exports from trading partners do not increase the number of 
varieties supplied by these countries, and hence do not generate benefits from the preference for variety 
assumed in the new economic geography models. For trading partners where welfare declines, but 
exports increase, our formulation omits a positive effect that may reverse the very small estimated 
overall negative impact. For markets where both welfare and exports decline, our analysis excludes a 
negative welfare impact contained in the new economic geography models. 
 
A recent paper by Amiti and Freund (2007) found that new products and new markets were important to 
China’s recent export success but much less so than in Hummels and Klenow (2006). Using highly 
disaggregated time series data of China’s exports to the US (10-digit HS data with over 16,000 codes) 
and 6-digit HS data on China’s export to all countries for the period 1992-2005 and Feenstra’s index of 
variety, they estimated an extensive margin of 31 percent – 15 percent associated with growth in new 
varieties and 16 percent associated with growth of existing varieties to new markets. This is 35 
percentage points lower than the estimate in Hummels and Klenow, but their estimate based on cross-
section estimation is not directly comparable with that of Amiti and Freund since the forces that generate 
product distribution across countries may be quite different from forces at work within countries over 
time. In addition, the estimate in Hummels and Klenow is an average effect for the 126 exporting 
countries in their U.N. data for 1995. The time period of the Amiti and Freund (2007) study may also be 
important. Manole and Martin (2007) found that the growth of non-traditional exports was much more 
rapid between 1980 and 1992 than in the post-1992 period. 
 
The extensive margin in developing countries other than China is likely to be much stronger than the 
extensive margin observed for China’s exports because in 1992 China’s export bundle was already very 
large and diverse, and overlapped with that of the developed countries much more substantially than one 
would expect given its level of development or its size (Schott 2007). It is quite plausible that the size of 
the extensive margin used for India is closer to the estimate in Hummels and Klenow (2006), while that 
for China may be closer to Amiti and Freund (2007). In addition to the uncertainty about the size of the 
extensive margin and the strength of purchasers’ love of variety there is also uncertainty about the size 
of the elasticity of substitution between different varieties. Hummels and Klenow (2006) consider 
estimates that vary between 5 and 10 based on estimates in Hummels (1999), but they also discuss the 
much lower value of 2.6 in Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) which is close to more recent estimates in 
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Kee et al. (2007). An elasticity of substitution lower than the one used in this paper (7.5) will enhance 
the welfare benefits of increased variety--other things equal-- because it implies that goods are more 
differentiated. The sensitivity of the welfare results to the choice of substitution parameters and the size 
of the extensive margin are important issues that we plan to examine in future. 
 
Finally, because we do not know the exact channels through which China and India will grow in the 
next fifteen years, we undertake three simulations that are alternatives to the neutral high-TFP scenarios, 
and which allow us to investigate whether China and India’s export growth might create more 
competition for developing or for industrial countries. We first study the implications of positive 
productivity shocks of 2 percent per year in the relatively capital and skill-intensive sectors considered 
in the case studies of Winters and Yusuf (2006): metals; electronics; machinery and equipment; 
automobiles, and commercial services in China and India. Then, we consider shocks that augment the 
stocks of human and physical capital, and could be expected to shift the composition of China’s exports 
towards goods more intensive in human and physical capital, and hence more competitive with the 
exports of the industrial countries. We first assess the impacts of a 2 percentage point annual increase in 
the stock of physical capital in China and India. Then, we compute the effects of a 2 percentage point 
annual increase in the stock of human capital in China and India. 
 
The macroeconomic closure of the simulation model assumes constant employment, perfect mobility of 
skilled and unskilled labor between sectors, and none between regions. Since we look at long run effects, 
we have doubled the elasticity of substitution between imported goods from different sources and 
between composite imported and domestic goods from the values used in the GTAP 6 Data Base. 
 
The effects on key variables of higher growth in China and India, and higher growth with and without 
increased variety and quality of exports are presented in Table 4. These impacts are presented for real 
incomes (welfare); for export volumes; and for terms-of-trade effects. For each variable, the effect 
depends upon whether the income increases in China and India result in intensive-margin growth of the 
same exports (“Growth”), or whether export growth is accompanied by expansion in the range of 
products exported, and improvements in their quality (“Growth, Variety and Quality”). Increases in real 
income presented are measures of equivalent variation in 2001 dollars. Export expansion is presented 
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A positive efficiency gain in China and India resulting in annual growth that is respectively 2.0 and 1.9 
percentage points higher than in the baseline will translate into a welfare gain of US$1.14 trillion for 
China and $362 billion for India relative to the baseline. The volume of exports increases by 29 percent 
from both India and China - an increase slightly larger than the corresponding increases in output. 
However, this export expansion is accompanied by declining export prices and a terms-of-trade loss of 
about US$48 billion for China and $12 billion for India. Such a terms-of-trade loss is an expected 
outcome in a model employing the Armington assumption of national product differentiation. 
 
The welfare changes for other countries are relatively small. Gains for most of China’s and India’s 
trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region are modest. High income countries gain, except for the 
European Union, where the interaction of existing distortions and structural change lead to an allocative 
efficiency loss. Many countries will benefit from improved terms-of-trade for their products as China 
increases its imports from the rest of the world by 23 percent and India by a similar amount. Some 
middle and low income countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, as well as other countries in South 
Asia, will lose as competition with China and India in third markets negatively affects their terms-of-
trade. 
 
Whereas the aggregate results suggest that competition from China and India would have a small impact 
on average real incomes, manufacturing industries in many countries are affected negatively,
13 and for 
industries in some countries these effects could be substantial (Table 5).
14 Improved growth of exports 
from China and India implies expansion of their textile industries and contraction of the textile 
industries in other countries relative to the baseline. Indonesia and Vietnam experience the largest 
                                                 
12 In our revised model framework where we incorporate product-quality-augmenting technical change, since the price of 
relevance to the importer is the effective price, which may fall when quality and variety increase, and the price relevant to the 
producer is the actual price, which rises when quality and variety increase, it is possible for the terms-of-trade to improve for 
both importer and exporter. 
13 Table 5 reports output changes for the manufacturing sectors in the model. While in some countries all manufacturing 
sectors contract, some other sectors (not reported in the table) expand as factor inputs move out of the shrinking 
manufacturing industries into the farm and services sectors.  
14 Results in the case of improved growth in China are available upon request and do not differ much from the results in the 
case of improved growth in China and India, except for India whose apparel industry contracts by 12 percent, while the 
impact on other industries is negligible.  
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contractions of 9.2 percent and 8.9 percent, respectively. The projected growth of China’s and India’s 
apparel industries means sharp contractions in apparel production elsewhere. The apparel industries of 
Vietnam and the Middle East and North Africa are expected to be the hardest hit as their output declines 
by nearly a fifth (19 percent). Similar declines will plague the light manufacturing industry (leather and 
other manufactures), although the expected declines are much smaller than the ones affecting apparel. 
With the exception of the electronics industry in Singapore and Thailand, competition from India and 
China leads to contractions of the electronic industries in other countries. Machinery and equipment 
production will also relocate to China and India, reducing the size of these industries in other countries. 
The expected expansion of the automobile production in China and India has a small negative effect on 
automobile production in other countries, with the exception of Mexico and Thailand.  
 
But not all will be bad news. The boost in China’s and India’s wood processing industries has positive 
spillover effects via increased demand for intermediate wood products from Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and other countries in East and South Asia. Similarly, growth in China and India will fuel 
demand for chemicals from the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, mineral products from Vietnam and 
other South East Asian countries, and metals from some countries in East Asia and South Asia (Table 5). 
 
Adding improvements in the variety and quality of exports from China and India to the high growth 
scenario increases the benefits to the world economy from $1.6 trillion to $1.8 trillion (Table 4). In this 
case, the volumes of exports from China and India grow by 55 and 47 percent respectively with positive 
terms-of-trade effects in all regions other than the Philippines. Most countries benefit since they can 
import higher volumes from these two countries at lower effective prices and also experience greater 
demand for their exports from China and India. The biggest beneficiaries are, of course, China and India, 
whose welfare increases by US$1.3 trillion and US$0.4 trillion, respectively. The volume of trade 
between China and India increases more than does either’s trade with the rest of the world, deepening 
the trade links between the two Asian giants. 
 
Pressure on middle-income developing countries to raise the quality of their exports will increase as a 
result of improved-quality Chinese and Indian exports. Without efforts to keep up with China and India, 
some countries – most notably the Philippines, Mexico, Vietnam and others in South East Asia – may 
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see their export shares eroded.
15 Improved quality exports from fast-growing China and India imply that 
competition in the markets for different manufactured goods will intensify and lead to further 
contractions of the electronics industry in all regions except Singapore and Thailand, the machinery and 
equipment industries in all countries except the Philippines, the textile, apparel and other light 
manufacturing sectors in most regions. As China starts producing more sophisticated and new varieties 
of electronics, machinery and equipment, it reduces the rate of expansion of its processing industries 
(wood, mineral, chemical and metals) leaving space for other countries to expand these industries (Table 
5).  
                                                 
15 In only one case – the Philippines – the welfare loss from improved growth in China and India worsens as China and India 
improve the quality of their exports and expand output of electronics, machinery and equipment (Table 5). Such an outcome 
can be explained with the high share of electronics in the Philippines’ total exports. Indeed, this share is higher than that of 
any other country/region in the model. 
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Table 4. Impacts of Improved Growth and Quality Exports in China and India, (relative to base, 
2020)   
 Welfare  Exports  Terms-of-Trade  Effects 
 
 Growth  Growth,  Variety    Growth  Growth, Variety  Growth Growth,  Variety 
      & Quality    & Quality    & Quality 
Regions  2001 $m  %    2001 $m  %  %  %  2001 $m  2001 $m 
Australia & N Zealand  2743 0.45  5568  0.91 -0.06  0.72  2652  5240 
China  1145733  39.9 1253425 43.6 29.41  55.34  -48229  38159 
Japan  6588  0.16 17276 0.42 2.44  4.80  9186  18946 
Korea  829 0.11  7451  1.00 3.45  5.83  -957  4646 
Hong Kong/Taiwan  3811  0.53 12749 1.78 1.94  3.78  4260  13307 
Indonesia  791 0.27  1822  0.61 0.18  -0.10  723  1907 
Malaysia  1555 0.87  3636  2.03 0.27  0.02  1570  3698 
Philippines  -627  -0.57 -994 -0.89  -0.26  -3.19  -559  -583 
Singapore  -2280  -1.68 -458 -0.34  4.92  6.50  -159  2019 
Thailand  -639 -0.31  492  0.24  1.63  2.33  -857  312 
Vietnam  -41 -0.07  166  0.29  -1.10  -2.33  63  468 
Rest of S E Asia  424  0.41 603 0.58  -2.85  -2.11  382  541 
India  361740 33.7  394490  36.7  28.89  47.05  -12379  10661 
Rest of South Asia  -962  -0.35 -159 -0.06  1.60  2.98  -1110  -517 
Canada  2767 0.32  5182  0.59 -0.91  -1.43  2634  4736 
USA  124 0.00 20262 0.15 0.67  2.87  479  20671 
Mexico  535 0.06  1000  0.11  -1.33  -2.37  175  489 
Argentina and Brazil  1410 0.13  3134  0.28 -0.06  0.45  1072  2570 
Rest of Latin America  3015 0.36  4703  0.56 -0.48  -0.26  2652  4251 
EU 25 & EFTA  -4306 -0.04  16893  0.18  -0.14  -0.18  3013  22183 
Former Soviet Union  9958  1.37 12914 1.77 1.34  2.34  9750  12039 
M East & North Africa  23780  1.31 29108 1.60  -1.50  -1.50  22592  27568 
Sub-Saharan Africa  4904 0.96  7676  1.50 -0.24  0.80  4004  6439 
Rest of the World  -688  -0.34 -500 -0.24  1.46  2.37  -596  -282 
Low inc. ctries (LICs)  366065 17.9  402775  19.7  14.04  23.44  -9039  17592 
Mid inc. ctries (MICs)  1184823  13.1 1308743 14.5 10.70  20.39  -11707  90130 
High income countries  10275  0.03 84923 0.28 0.79  1.73  21109  91749 
World  1561163 3.8  1796437  4.3  4.4 8.5  363 199472 
LICs (excl India)  4325 0.46  8286  0.87 -0.07  0.77  3339  6931 
MICs (excl China)  39091  0.61 55315 0.87  -0.18  -0.16  36522  51971 
Source: Authors’ simulations with modified GTAP model; see details in text.. 
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Table 5. Manufacturing: Effects of Improved Growth in China and India (percent relative to base, 
2020) 
Regions  Textiles Apparel Leather  Wood  Minerals  Chemicals  Metals  Auto  Machinery Electronics  Other 
Australia &   -6.9
a -8.6  -8.5  -1.3 -1.1  -0.8 -4.1 -2.4  -6.7  -5.9 -8.4 
New Zealand  -15.3
b -15.5  -13.7  -1.5 0.2  -3.4 -3.9 -6.3  -13.9 -18.5  -15.3 
China  35.5 20.3 39.4 41.6  36.8  42.9 38.5 34.8  37.6  35.8 30.5 
  30.0 20.5 45.2 34.7  36.3  39.2 34.8 40.9  40.2  58.2 33.1 
Japan  -1.6  -6.0  -5.3  -1.1 -1.0  -2.3 -2.7 -3.9  -6.6  -4.8 -4.2 
  15.1  -8.0  -8.1  -1.0 -0.6  -1.4 -1.9 -6.6  -9.0  -10.7  -6.8 
Korea  -1.3  -2.1  -1.6  0.4 -0.6  -1.7 1.7 -3.0  -1.9  0.0 -7.7 
  10.0  -3.7  10.6  4.1 -0.8  2.7 3.9 -9.2  -7.0  -7.9  -11.7 
Hong  Kong    -5.9 -7.3 -7.1 -2.2  -1.7  -4.8  -5.0  -3.6  -5.7  -2.9  -15.8 
& Taiwan*   1.7  -1.0  -4.3  -2.5 -3.9  -2.2 -8.8  -10.0 -10.7 -10.6  -26.3 
Indonesia  -9.2  -11.7  -7.7  4.6 -2.6  0.3 -5.9 -0.5  -1.2  -1.4  -10.6 
  -15.6 -21.4 -20.0 15.4  -3.4  0.9  -8.9  -2.8  -4.4  -12.0  -19.2 
Malaysia  -7.5  -15.8  -5.7  0.6 -1.3  1.9 -1.6 -1.1  -4.6  -0.2 -3.6 
  -7.3  -27.4  -4.2  5.1 0.5  4.4 1.2 -2.4 -5.9 -3.5  -5.5 
Philippines -7.4  -15.7  -8.7  -0.2  -0.3  3.9 0.1 0.0  -0.2 -4.0  -6.4 
  -14.3 -25.7 -17.0  1.9  1.3  5.5 2.6 0.4  4.0 -13.9  -9.9 
Singapore  -8.0  -8.1  -11.2  -0.6 2.1  0.7 2.0 -3.6  -1.8  3.4  -10.9 
  -7.9 -16.9  -21.7 1.6  3.9  0.8  5.0 -11.4  -2.5  5.2 -20.3 
Thailand  -5.1  -5.0  -6.0  1.5  -0.6 2.0  0.5  0.5 -1.4 4.6  -8.1 
  -9.1  -9.5  -13.9  6.5 0.3  3.0 2.2 0.3  -3.7  6.2  -15.5 
Vietnam  -8.9  -19.3  -5.6  -0.9 0.3  -1.1 -4.9 -4.7  -7.7  -4.8 -6.6 
  -15.6 -35.5 -11.9  -0.1  1.0  2.4  -8.4 -8.0  -12.8 -12.6  -10.4 
Rest  of    -6.3  -3.6  -3.4  0.7  0.7  -0.5 -1.2 -0.4  -3.5  -0.5 -0.8 
S. East Asia  -12.4  -6.2  -5.6  9.1  1.4  -2.4 -2.1 -1.1  -6.0  -2.4 -1.2 
India  35.1 23.3 41.4 39.8  30.7  30.6 33.9 30.6  29.2  30.7 23.5 
  26.2 11.1 45.5 32.1  33.9  33.1 34.0 30.0  41.5  36.5 15.6 
Rest  of    -2.7  -12.4  -1.2  0.7 -1.6  -0.4 3.8 -1.5  -3.2  -0.2 -6.4 
South Asia  -6.4  -25.5  -6.3  2.3  -1.9 -1.2  10.5  -3.8 -8.1 -8.9  -11.6 
Canada  -4.4 -8.3 -3.7 -1.4  -2.4  -4.0  -2.1  0.0  -4.1  -2.2  -12.7 
  -5.8  -14.9  -3.7  -1.1 -2.6  -3.8 -4.3 -1.0  -8.5  -11.0  -20.5 
USA  -5.4 -8.7 -4.3 -0.2  0.1  0.9  -0.7  -0.2  -2.5  -3.5  -10.5 
  -10.5 -15.3  -6.4  0.3  0.2  1.4  -1.0  -0.4  -4.2  -11.0  -16.7 
Mexico  -2.1 -2.2 -0.8 0.2  0.1  0.9  -0.3  0.7  -4.1  -3.8  -6.5 
  -3.9  -3.6  -1.3  1.2 0.8  1.6 0.4 2.0  -5.7 -13.2  -10.1 
Argentina  &    -2.0  -1.1  -6.6  -1.0 -1.0  -2.0 -3.2 -1.8  -4.5  -3.1 -2.9 
Brazil  -3.4 -1.8 -8.4 -0.9  0.0  -2.8  -4.5  -2.5  -7.4  -8.0  -4.9 
Rest  of  Latin -4.5 -4.2 -3.4 -0.5  -0.2 -0.3  -2.8  -1.3 -5.5 -5.3  -8.8 
America  -9.5 -7.9 -6.1 0.4  1.1  -1.4  -2.6  -2.5  -9.9  -15.1 -14.4 
EU 25 &   -5.6  -9.7  -5.0  0.0  -0.4  -1.8  -0.7  -0.4  -2.4  -2.5  -3.9 
EFTA  -9.9  -16.8  -8.5  0.8 -0.5  -3.0 -1.3 -1.3  -5.0  -11.7  -6.6 
Former    -2.6 -4.7 -1.4 -0.5  -1.9 -1.1  -3.3  -0.3 -4.4 -3.1  -3.2 
Soviet Union  -5.8 -9.4 -4.2 0.8  -2.2  -1.6  -2.9  0.1  -7.9  -6.6  -5.7 
Middle East   -8.6  -18.6  -2.6  -0.7  -0.5 -5.8  -6.6  -3.2 -8.3 -7.2  -9.1 
& N. Africa  -14.8  -29.4  -3.7  -0.7 0.3  -5.9 -6.5 -4.9  -12.9 -15.9  -13.4 
Sub-Saharan   -4.6 -5.5 -4.1 0.0  -0.1  0.3  -2.3  -3.8  -8.4  -7.4  -7.6 
Africa  -10.4 -10.3  -7.7  0.6  1.2  -2.0 1.4 -8.5 -16.1 -24.9  -13.3 
Rest of   -2.9  -7.7  -1.7  1.1  -0.1  0.0  -1.2  -0.3  -1.9  -1.8  -14.3 
the World  -5.3  -12.9  -4.1  2.5  -0.1 -1.4  -2.6  -0.7 -4.7 -7.0  -24.0 
Source: Authors’ simulations with modified GTAP model; see details in text. 
* Hong Kong, China and Taiwan, China. 
a For each partner numbers in the first row are results for the case of improved growth in China and India. 
b For each partner numbers in the second row are results for the case of improved growth and quality exports in China and India. 
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A positive productivity shock of 2 percent per year in the five Chinese and Indian sectors considered in 
Winters and Yusuf (2006) – metals, electronics, machinery and equipment, motor vehicles and 
commercial services – is beneficial to the world and all developing countries except the Philippines 
(Table 6). However, this efficiency improvement in China and India entails substantial structural change 
(Table 7). China and India become much more powerful players in these sectors and world trade grows 
much faster than envisaged under the scenario of neutral total factor productivity (TFP) growth of 2 
percent. Exports from China double and exports from India jump by more than 72 percent. World trade 
expands by 11 percent, as regional trade between China and developed economies in the Asia Pacific 
region (Japan, Korea, and US), and India and its closest partners in South Asia will grow as well. The 
huge effects on trade arise because the assumed stimulus is to existing export sectors, so it exacerbates 
imbalances between local supply and demand and hence requires increased trade to restore equilibrium. 
 
Under this scenario China and India expand their heavy industry and high-tech manufacturing sectors, 
leaving space for other countries to increase production of light manufactures, chemicals, and minerals 
(Table 7).  Still, exports from many developing economies that compete with China and India decline as 
a result of the improved efficiency of China’s and India’s heavy industries, and high-tech manufacturing 
sectors. Most notable is the decline of exports from the Philippines (18 percent) and Thailand (10 
percent), whose electronics sectors declines by 65 percent and 53 percent, respectively. All economies 
experience structural change of a similar magnitude. China and India shift out of textiles and light 
manufactures, whereas the rest of the economies shift out of heavy and high-tech manufactures.  
 
Improved growth through accelerated accumulation of capital (2 percentage points faster than the 
baseline) benefits China and India, and modestly affects real incomes in other regions (Table 6). China 
and India increase their production of all manufactured goods, but the expansion of the capital-intensive 
sectors is larger than that of other sectors. Since the capital-intensive sectors are the sectors experiencing 
efficiency gains in the previous scenario, the export and sector specific changes are similar but smaller 
in absolute value than the ones presented for the case of improved efficiency of China’s and India’s 
metals, electronics, machinery and equipment, motor vehicles and commercial services in Table 7.  
 
Finally, improved growth through accelerated accumulation of human capital (2 percentage points per 
year higher than the baseline) has a much smaller effect on welfare, exports, and sector outputs than 
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improved growth through accelerated accumulation of physical capital (Table 6). This is the case 
because the share of skilled labor is much lower than the share of capital in total factor endowment. 
Concluding Remarks 
This study highlights the very sharp differences in the trade patterns of India and China and assesses the 
implications of rapid growth and structural change on the trade patterns of China, India and the rest of 
the world. The paper shows that services exports are roughly twice as important for India as for China. 
Within merchandise trade, both are dependent on manufactures, with China much more strongly 
integrated into production networks through trade in parts and components. However, their product 
mixes are radically different, with only one product—refined petroleum—appearing in the top 25 
products for both. Each country has undergone quite radical trade reform.  
 
The impact of implementing a well-functioning duty drawback system in India on the world economy is 
negligible but it is significant for some Indian industries. India’s reform efforts to integrate better with 
the world economy are unlikely to intensify head-on competition between China and India. Indeed, our 
growth analysis suggests there is scope for China and India to strengthen their trade ties and expand 
their exports and imports significantly without hurting each other’s development prospects or those of 
other economies. However, improved growth in China and India will intensify competition in global 
markets for manufactures, and the manufacturing industries in many countries will be affected 
negatively. Improvement in the range and quality of exports from both countries has the potential to 
create substantial welfare benefits to the world, and to each other, and to act as a powerful offset to the 
terms-of-trade losses otherwise associated with rapid export growth. Without efforts to keep up with 
China and India, some countries may see further erosion of their export shares and high-tech 
manufacturing sectors. As China starts producing more sophisticated and new variety manufacturing 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Efficiency improvements in China’s and India’s high-tech and heavy industries have much stronger 
trade effects than a uniform efficiency improvement of the same magnitude. This scenario will lead to 
severe competition in the high-tech sectors and entail substantial structural change with China and 
India displacing other countries in markets for high-tech products, but leaving space for other countries 
to increase production of light manufactures.  
 
Some caveats are important. First, these are thought experiments and not precise predictions. While 
they show that China’s and India’s growth could be beneficial to nearly all other countries, and that the 
impact on particular countries will depend on those countries’ own trade, production and consumption 
profiles and on the patterns of growth in China and India, they offer only the broadest indications of 
likely effects. Likewise, our results strongly suggest that benefiting will depend on adapting to the new 
opportunities and challenges. But by themselves these results cannot dictate the necessary adjustment. 
They must be supplemented with sector-specific case studies both to identify the emerging patterns in 
general and to consider particular products, as well as services which we did not discuss in the analysis 
of growth and trade effects. Our aggregation hides important information on intra-industry trade in 
components as part of the global production sharing arrangements. 
 
Note that the adjustment costs of this economic transformation could be substantial, but are not 
factored into the analysis. Finally, recall also that the paper focuses on the static trade aspects of 
growth in China and India; it ignores important investment-growth linkages that may amplify the 
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